This is a compilation of information on the location and layout of the Resettlement Center at Fort McCoy, WI., for Cuban refugees.

Ted Molczan
2015 Jul 17

Source file locations:

http://www.mccoy.army.mil/AboutUs/History/FMCHistHrtg.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a156353.pdf

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a121197.pdf

File 2014RAD.pdf contains a present day map of Ft. McCoy, which shows all of the blocks referred to by the above sources:

http://www.milwnavyleague.org/PDFs/2014RAD.pdf

Block numbers are not referred to in a consistent manner. Most commonly, they are numbered 100 through 2800, but 1 through 28 could also be used, e.g. Blocks 8 and 800 are the same. Sometimes, "area" is used instead of "block."

The following extracts are mostly copied and pasted OCR text, with manual clean-up of obvious errors. The text is not guaranteed to be accurate, so please refer to the source document before use for a serious purpose.


In May 1980, Fort McCoy
was designated as a Resettlement Center for Cuban refugees
who came to the United States when Fidel Castro allowed them
to leave Cuba as part of the “Freedom Flotilla.” Many of these
refugees were hopeful they would find sponsors in the United
States. The settlement center utilized all installation buildings on
the east side of the cantonment area, as well as buildings in the
2700 and 2800 block areas. Approximately 15,000 Cubans were
housed here through September. During this mission, support
personnel included hundreds of Soldiers, federal civilians and
contractor personnel. (File FMCHistHrtg.pdf, p.16, pdf 16)


Engineer Planning and Preparation. Fort McCoy Facility Engineer
personnel accomplished extensive planning and preparation for the support
of the refugee processing center operation prior to the arrival of
Task Force staff personnel. They had already planned, directed, and
implemented both internal and external construction and utility projects,
including containment area fencing, activation of buildings
(utilities, water, sewage, electrical), and partitioning of barracks.
They had also processed and coordinated extensive support requirements
by civilian governmental agencies assigned to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), attached military support units, and Fort
McCoy installation activities. During the period 23 through 25 May, the
416th Engineer Command (USAR) constructed over 20,000 linear feet of
fencing and gates surrounding the 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700
blocks. Fifth U.S. Army extended the command's Annual Training period
for two additional days for selected subordinate units to accomplish
thin mission. During the period 24 through 27 May, a Task Force (two
construction companies (-) of 180 personnel from the 52d Engineer
Battalion (CBT)(HVY), Fort Carson, Colo., constructed required billet
and latrine partitions for 35 buildings which had been assigned as refugee
family quarters. In addition, the Task Force prefabricated an additional
fifteen partition mats to be installed when actually required.
(File a156353, p.133, pdf 156)


Photo caption: On 4 July 1980, Cuban refugees from the single-male compound,
Building 712, proudly display a hand-painted sign thanking everyone
for all the hospitality bestowed upon them. (File a156353, p.157, pdf 180)

Initial Holding Area. During peak periods, the Task Force had to
establish holding areas for upwards of 4,000 refugees while they awaited
processing. This level of refugee population exceeded the area initially
established for this purpose by 3,400 spaces. In retrospect, it 
would have been wiser to have used the hospital area for this purpose
since it had the capacity to provide adequate holding facilities, two
dining facilities, and was within walking distance of the inprocessing
center. (File a156353, p.159, pdf 182)


On 2 June 1980, the FORSCOM commander informed officials at Fort
McCoy that the above guidance would remain in effect but would be
modified as follows. He directed that a perimeter be established
around the area in which the detainees were located (Detainee Enclave).

This perimeter was to be clearly marked and posted with signs in English
and Spanish prohibiting the Cuban detainees from unauthorized departure
from the Detainee Enclave. Military personnel would be used to assist
in maintaining the perimeter and would be stationed along the perimeter
and at any gates or openings to deter, detect, and make resonable
efforts to prevent unauthorized departures. The use of physical
barriers was also permitted at the option of the military commander.
Military personnel could use reasonable measures to prevent unauthorized
passage outside of the perimeter, first with oral warnings and, if those
failed, reasonable, but wholly non-lethal, measures to deter the
detainees from attempting to cross the perimeter. Only the minimum
measures required to deter the detainees were authorized. The measures
taken would not impose a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Military
personnel could be authorized to use nightsticks and riot control
equipment. The use of night sticks or batons as a barrier might prove
to be sufficient to deter individuals from leaving the enclave. Individuals
would not be struck in the head or otherwise subjected to excessive
measures. Firearms without ammunition might be used. An outer
perimeter would be established around the Federal installation, and
appropriate reaction forces would be maintained. If the Detainee
Enclave was breached, the same measures discussed above would be applied
to prevent them from leaving the Federal installation. Finally, military
personnel would not leave the installation to pursue and apprehend
detainees. 21 (File a156353, pp.170-171, pdf 193-194)


Photo caption: A view of the maximum security detention area for Cuban refugees.
Surrounded by concertina wire with four guard towers, this detention
area was used in WW II for prisoners of war. 
(File a156353, p.190, pdf 213)


Photo caption: On 10 September 1980, Cuban refugee volunteers put back the fence
which other Cuban refugees had torn down three days earlier.
(File a156353, p.191, pdf 214)


On 7 September 1980,
for example, some 300 of the refugees knocked down an estimated two
thirds of the chain link fence surrounding the all male refugee compound.
All available personnel assigned to the 759th MP Battalion and
the 1st Battalion (Mech), 12th Infantry, were committed to cordon off
the disturbance area. The reaction force was forced to use CS (tear
gas) on a limited basis in one area to turn back a group of the refugees
who were attempting to get to the Westleg of Fort McCoy which contained
the unaccompanied minor area, the family area, detention areas, and the
single male compound. (File a156353, p.200, pdf 223)


Male homosexuals were assigned to the same barracks as female juveniles and
all juveniles had complete and free access to all barracks, even in
Section 700-A which had been designed as a maximum Security area for
"those Cuban Juveniles who volunteered to reside there. Classes, mostly
English, were offered on a voluntary basis to the children in Section
700-A only, but they made up only a small percentage of the 400 juveniles
then in residence in the refugee processing center. There was
little evidence of extensive organized recreational activities for juveniles.
In fact, some juveniles outside of Section 700-A had been forced
to stay in their barracks for fear of being physically or sexually
assaulted. (File a156353, p.202, pdf 225)


At approximately 1600 that day [Sep 7 - TJM], a demonstration resulted when some
300 Cuban refugees knocked down approximately 7,000 feet of the 6-foot
high chain link fence surrounding the single male compound. There were
no major injuries, no incident of mass escape, and no acts of violence
by the Cuban refugees. The Task Force commander committed all available
personnel assigned to the 759th MP Battalion and to the 1st Battalion
(Mech), 12th Infantry, to cordon off the disturbance area. Troops used
CS gas (tear gas) on a limited basis in one area to turn back a group of
Cuban refugees who were attempting to get to the Westleg of Fort McCoy.
By 2030, the Cuban refugee demonstrators had quieted down and the troops
restored order throughout the refugee center. The unaccompanied minor
area, the familiy area, the detention areas, and the single male compound
on the west side of the camp were unaffected by the disturbance.
Military police and Battalion Reaction Force personnel detained a total
of twenty-one Cubans and turned them over the the U.S. Marshals for
further action. By 2330, the overall situation had stabiliaed to the
point where the Task Force commander was able to reconstitute a military
police reserve of 122 personnel and to reduce the number of perimeter
guards. In addition, he positioned 150 infantrymen of the Battalion
Reaction Force in the woods adjacent to their portion of the perimeter.
On the following day, the 2d Battalion (Abn), 502d Infantry, began
arriving at Fort McCoy to conduct training and to provide additional
troops for use by the Task Force commander. On 9 September, some 150
Cuban refugee volunteers reconstructed the fence. 26
(File a156353, p.209, pdf 232)


At approximately 1900 on the same date, a disturbance occurred at
the Immigration and Naturalization Service detention facility in Area
800. Cuban detainees attempted to break through the double entrance
gates (sally port). They succeeded in battering their way through the
first gate using a water trailer. Military police reaction forces
responded to an Immigration and Naturalizaton Service request for support
and used CS gas to disperse the detainees. Officers of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service and U.S. Marshals entered the detention
area supported by military police and apprehended sixteen agitators.
These were then transferred to the U.S, Marshals' detention facility in
Area 1000. The Task Force commander placed elements of the reaction
force on standby alert. Participating military personnel suffered no
injuries in this incident. However, one U.S. Marshal did sustain a
thigh injury for which he was treated and released to quarters. The
disturbance was quelled at 2000. Less than one hour later (2047),
Building 611 (Recreation Building) was reported on fire.
(File a156353, p.210, pdf 233)


An example of avoidance of direct confrontation if there was any
acceptable alternative, no matter how undesirable that alternative might
be in comparison to the preferred course of action, involved the movement
of refugees in mid-July from the West Leg to the East Leg within
Fort McCoy. The number of refugee resettlements made up to this time
permitted such a consolidation of facilities and support personnel,
When informed of the move, however, the West Leg occupants strongly protested.
They observed that there were only a few hundred of them; so 
they were a relatively close knit group with firmly established leaders
who might lose power in a larger population. They claimed that political
enemies in the East Leg would murder many of them. They stated
that they would burn the compound and kill military police or anyone
else who tried to make them move. For all the reasons that make a one-front
operation desirable, it would have been advantageous to empty the
West Leg and close it. However, the potential risks to property, to
Cuban as well as American lives, and of generating unfavorable publicity
with its resulting adverse impact of refugee resettlement operations
nationwide outweighed the consolidation advantages. Hence, the West Leg
population was permitted to stay where it was until the consolidation at
Fort Chaffee occurred in late September and early October. Surprisingly,
the West Leg population still remaining at Fort McCoy at that
time was very willing to move to Fort Chaffee.
(File a156353, p.242, pdf 265)


Detention Facility Problems

Detention facilities -- Block 8 and Buildings 1065 - 1067 -- at
Fort McCoy merited some discussion since they proved to be the major
sources of military police concern throughout the Cuban refugee operation.
The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service operated Building
8 [probably meant Block 8 - TJM] and the U.S. Marshals Service operated Buildings 1065 - 1067.

Felon Detention Facility Problems. Block 8 was a prisoner of war
training camp used by Reserve Component units charged with the safeguarding
of prisoners of war in future American military operations.

This was totally inadequate for the safeguarding of convicted Cuban
felons during the early days of Cuban refugee operations. Overall
security of the area improved substantially in the latter half of June
with the construction of an additional 12-foot high fence. For most of
the hectic summer of 1980, the military police in the area were positioned
in mobile listening posts located not far from the facility.
They were positioned in such a way that they could be seen by the
detainees and served as a deterrent against disturbances and escapes, as
well as a rapid reaction force for either event. Unfortunately, the
area was not lighted as well as it should have been and, as a general
rule, not more than 2 of the 4 corner guard towers were manned -- frequently,
only 1. Block 8, as noted above, was primarily a facility for
felons, which was constantly undermanned by Immigration and Naturalization
Service guards who were neither trained nor experienced in detention
operations. Consequently, it constituted a source of great concern
to the Military Police throughout the entire operation. The 759th
Military Police Battalion's concern was rooted in the fact that it was
responsible for supporting the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
controlling disturbances and riots, and for making "all costs" efforts
at apprehending Cuban refugee escapees. It seemed that everyone at Fort
McCoy but the Military Police was surprised that the additional 12-foot
high fence and concertina did not make Block 8 escape-proof, it might
have been escape-proof if the Immigration and Naturalization Service had
done a better job of guarding.
(File a156353, pp.246-247, pdf 269-270)


Misdemeanor Detention Facility Problems. Buildings 1065 - 1067
were three old-style psychiatric wards in the huge Fort McCoy hospital
complex. Operated, as noted above, by the U.S. Marshals Service, this
facility was used for Cuban refugees who had comitted offenses generally
characterized as misdemeanors. Just as in the case of Block 8, the
U.S. Marshals Service guard force was undermanned and had neither training
nor experience in operating detention facilities. Major problems
involved basic security (leaving doors open and not guarding the sides
or back of the facility); overcrowding; the absence of sentencing or
identification procedures which were systematically followed; and the
condition of the structure itself. The entire hospital complex was a
maze of wards (buildings) all interconnected by corridors, roof cavities,
and crawl space under the floors. Cuban refugee escapees could,
and did, disappear very quickly by getting into the ceiling space or
under a floor. The Military Police battalion commander recommended that
a 10-foot section between Ward 1067 and the rest of the complex be
removed. This would have isolated the detention facility and would probably
have solved most of the escapee problems. However, higher
authority disapproved this recommendation as too damaging to the structure.
The military police were thus required to devote a continued and
costly number of manhours in containing disturbances and escapes
throughout the entire operation.
(File a156353, p.247, pdf 270)


Note: the following regards the transfer of refugees in Sep 1980 from Fort McCoy, Wisconsin to Fort Chafee, Arkansas:

The Liberty Gate complex (Buildings 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 239) will be utilized as the staging
area.

Aliens are to be moved from their barracks area to the staging area
the day before their scheduled departure.
(File a121197, pdf 336)